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Abstract
Web servers and web-based applications are commonly used as attack targets. The main issues are how to prevent
unauthorised access and to protect web servers from the attack. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are widely used
security tools to detect cyber-attacks and malicious activities in computer systems and networks. In this paper, we focus
on the detection of various web-based attacks using Geometrical Structure Anomaly Detection (GSAD) model and we
also propose a novel algorithm for the selection of most discriminating features to improve the computational complexity
of payload-based GSAD model. Linear Discriminant method (LDA) is used for the feature reduction and classification of
the incoming network traffic. GSAD model is based on a pattern recognition technique used in image processing. It
analyses the correlations between various payload features and uses Mahalanobis Distance Map (MDM) to calculate the
difference between normal and abnormal network traffic. We focus on the detection of generic attacks, shell code attacks,
polymorphic attacks and polymorphic blending attacks. We evaluate accuracy of GSAD model experimentally on the
real-world attacks dataset created at Georgia Institute of Technology. We conducted preliminary experiments on the
DARPA 99 dataset to evaluate the accuracy of feature reduction.
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INTRODUCTION
The universal use of the Internet has made it more difficult to achieve a high security level, and attackers target more
often on web applications. Cyber-attacks and breaches of information security appear to be increasing in frequency and
impact (Internet Storm Center, 2009; Perdisci et al., 2009; Packet Storm, 2006).
Web servers and web-based applications are popular attack targets because tools used for creating web applications are
easy to use, and many people writing and deploying them have little background in security. Web servers and web-based
applications are vulnerable to attack because of improper and poor security policy and methodology. Hence securing
Network server system is an important and difficult task.
The commonly used IDSs are: signature based intrusion detection systems and anomaly based intrusion detection
systems. Signature based IDS(s), are based on pattern matching techniques. An alert is raised when a match of attack
signature is found. Unfortunately, signature based IDS is unable to detect novel attack (i.e., zero-day) or polymorphic
attacks, until the signature database is updated. Due to the ad hoc and dynamic nature of web traffic, it is difficult to keep
intrusion detection signature sets updated regularly. The diversity of the cyber-attacks makes signature-based IDSs less
suitable for protecting a web-based service.
On the other hand, an anomaly-based intrusion detection system builds a statistical model of the normal behaviour of the
monitored system/network. Any deviation of the incoming event profile with respect to the normal profile is considered
as anomaly and raises an alarm. Anomaly based IDS can detect new attacks and variances of attacks. Since they do not
require any prior knowledge of the application or system, an anomaly based system can protect custom-developed
applications, e.g. web applications. However, an anomaly based system has a relatively high number of false positives. It
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is a difficult and challenging task for anomaly based detector to characterise normal behaviour because web traffic is
highly variable.
Statistical techniques are proposed to solve the anomaly detection problem for web servers. Tandon and Chan (2005)
proposed a model based on system calls' arguments along with the sequences of system calls. Lio and Vemuri (2002)
proposed a model based on text categorisation, and used a 'bag of system calls' representation. Unfortunately system call
monitoring was not a suitable solution for web servers because of the mis-configuration of web server or errors in the
web application code.
Recent works in anomaly detection based on packet payload can be found in (Kruegel, Vigna & Robertson, 2005;
Mahoney & Chan, 2003; Tombini et al., 2005; Wang & Stolfo, 2004). The drawbacks of these IDSs are relatively high
false positive rates. It is more difficult to construct an accurate model because of the curse of dimensionality and
computational complexity. In (Estevez-Tapiador et al., 2004), Estevez-Tapiador et al. proposed a theoretical framework
for intrusion detection at application layer. A model for specific service requests was developed using short sequences of
adjoining bytes in the payload. Similarity between the payloads was evaluated using distance between the two points in
the payload in Hilbert space. It has low detection rates and high false alarm rate for small sequences of characters of
length k. This approach has high computational complexity and does not define the criteria of the selection of sequences
of characters. All these approaches for anomaly detection ignored the correlation between the features of the payload.
Various feature reduction techniques used to reduce the header features of the packets are discussed in (YANG & QI,
2008; Shih et al. 2008; Singh & Silakari, 2009; Chen et al, 2006). Not much research is conducted on the packet payload
feature reduction. The early feature reduction approaches on payload are given in (Nwanze & Summerville, 2008).
We have conducted a study of HTTP traffic for intrusion detection in (Jamdagini et al., 2010) on DARPA 1999 IDS
dataset. The results obtained are very encouraging. In this paper, we will further evaluate the accuracy of GSAD model
on GATECH attack dataset (Perdisci et al., 2009), which is a real attack dataset. Some of these attacks are generated
from DARPA 1999 attack dataset. Interesting results are obtained and demonstrated through experiments. We further
discuss the means of automatically updating the model to maintain an accurate view of normal payloads seen most
recently. We update the mean and standard deviation as mentioned in (Knuth, 1973).
Current anomaly Intrusion Detection Systems are not efficient for real time intrusion detection due to high computational
complexity. In this paper we further propose a novel algorithm for the selection of most discriminating features to
improve the computational complexity of GSAD model. This not only reduces the computational complexity but also
reduces the testing time of the classifier. Linear Discriminant method (LDA) is used for the feature reduction and
classification of the incoming network traffic. This will reduce the high dimensional MDM feature space (256 2) in to a
very low dimensional feature space with high efficiency and low use of system resources.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II presents brief description of GSAD model in HTTP environment and
datasets used for the experiments, as well as the experimental results. In Section III we analyse our results obtained from
the experiments. In Section IV, we discuss the feature reduction module (FRM) and algorithm used for the selection of
most discriminating features and discusses results obtained from the preliminary testing. Finally, Section V draws
conclusions and future works.

GSAD MODEL, DATASET AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Brief Description of GSAD Model
The description of GSAD model in HTTP environment is given in (Jamdagini et al., 2010). In this section, we give a
brief description of GSAD model in HTTP environment.
The key components of GSAD model are a 1-byte feature model and a GSM. In the GSAD each feature represents the
occurrence frequency of one of the 256 ASCII characters in the payload. A model of normal HTTP traffic is then
constructed by computing the MDM of each packet payload. Weight factor is used to recognize intrusive action. The
model uses a pattern recognition technique (Chen et al., 2007) to calculate the correlations between various payload
features. This facilitates the anomaly detection ability of an IDS system without the prior knowledge of network attacks.
An alarm is generated if the weight factor score is greater than the predetermined threshold value.
The payload obtained from HTTP GET request is represented by a pattern vector X in a 256–dimensional feature space.
The average value of features, μ, and the covariance value of each feature, ∑i, in the 1- byte payload model for ‘HTTP
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request’ traffic , and Mahalanobis distance, ݀ሺǡሻ are calculated using (2), (3) and (4) in (Jamdagini et al., 2010)
Mahalanobis Distance Map D of a ‘HTTP request’ network packet is constructed as follow,
݀ሺǡሻ
ۍ
݀
 ܦൌ  ێሺଵǡሻ
ڭ ێ
݀ۏሺଶହହǡሻ

݀ሺǡଵሻ ڮ
ǥ
݀

 ሺଵǡଵሻ
ڰڭ
݀ሺଶହହǡଵሻ ڮ

݀ሺǡଶହହሻ

ې
ۑ
ڭ
ۑ
݀ሺଶହହǡଶହହሻ ے

The MDM investigate the geometrical relationship of the correlations among the payload features. We create a statistical
model of the normal profile of ‘HTTP request’ by considering the distance maps of m normal packets, (denoted by ܦଵ ,

… , ܦ
). The averages and variances for all elements (i, j) of the distance maps are computed by the (5) and (6) in
(Jamdagini et al., 2010). Here (0 ≤ i, j ≤ 255), and ݀ሺǡሻǡ is the (i, j) element of distance maps ܦ . The ݀ҧሺǡሻ and
ଶ
are all kept in a model Mnor for further evaluation.
ߪሺǡሻ
In the recognition phase, new incoming network packet is processed using procedures (1) – (6) in (Jamdagini et al., 2010)
to construct its Mahalanobis Distance Map (Dobj ).


ܦ ൌ ൣ݀ǡ ൧

ଶହൈଶହ

Then, similarity calculation (Weight factor w) is calculated to estimate the Mahalanobis distance between incoming
‘HTTP request’ map Dobj and the generated normal HTTP traffic map using equation (7) in (Jamdagini et al., 2010). If the
Weight factor w is beyond the thresholds the incoming packet is considered as an intrusion.
We reviewed the GSAD model by updating the 1-byte distribution and MDMs for new observed normal samples. This is
achieved by updating mean and standard deviation of each ASCII character seen for each new sample observed in the
packet payload. We generated mean and standard deviation for 256 ASCII characters array for n payloads in the model.
This is implemented as an incremental learning model.

Dataset and Experimental Results
In this section, we present the experiments conducted in HTTP environment using GSAD model to detect various webbased attacks. The DARPA 1999 training dataset (Lippmann et al., 2000; Fielding et al., 1999) is used for constructing
normal profile of HTTP traffic. For attack traffic, GATECH attack dataset (Perdisci et al., 2009) is used since this is real
attack dataset. And some of the attacks are similar to DARPA 1999 dataset.
We implement the GSAD model using Matlab 2009b. Experiments are conducted to determine an appropriate value of
threshold. We consider in our experiments (lower and higher) threshold range from -3 standard deviation of Weight
factor to +3 standard deviation of Weight factor for achieving optimal detection rates and low false positive alarm rates.

Experimental Results
We conducted experiments using our GSAD model on training (normal) dataset and test (attack) dataset. Brief
descriptions of the datasets are given in the training and testing sections below. In the first part of our experiments, we
present the model generation for normal HTTP traffic. Afterwards, we evaluate the accuracy of our GSAD model in
detecting various attacks, namely generic attacks, shell code attacks, polymorphic attacks and polymorphic blending
attack coming through HTTP services.

TRAINING OF GSAD MODEL ON DARPA 1999 IDS DATASET
a.
Training dataset (DARPA 1999 IDS dataset): Although DARPA 1999 database is not without criticism (McHugh, 2000)
but this is the only standard dataset available publically. We extract inbound ‘HTTP request’ packets from DARPA 1999
(Lippmann et al., 2000), week 1 (5 days) and week 3 (5 days) labelled as attack free for the training of GSAD model. The
total numbers of packets used for training of the model after filtering are 13,933 and 10,464 for hosts marx and hume
respectively ((Lippmann et al., 2000).
b. Model Training: HTTP is an application-layer protocol which provides a distributed, and collaborative hypermedia
information systems service. The communication between the HTTP-client and HTTP-server uses a Request/Response
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standard (Ingham & Inoue, 2007). In the experiments, we train the GSAD model on the training dataset and generate a
normal profile for the HTTP GET request. For normal profile, we first generate a character’s relative frequency model,
and then develop an average geometrical structure model using equations (1) to (4) in (Jamdagini et al., 2010) for hosts
marx and hume respectively. Due to the limitation of space, the results are shown for one host only, and the similar
behaviour is obtained for the other host.
Figure 1 (a) shows the character’s relative frequency model and (b) shows the MDM pattern of normal HTTP traffic
behaviour for host marx. In Figure 1 (b), the X axis and Y axis show the 256 possible features (ASCII characters) present
in a packet payload. The cross point on the figure represents correlation between two features. Although from the MDM
patterns (GSAD model) we can distinguish and infer visually the suspected incoming packet from the normal network
traffic, but because of link speed and large amount of everyday network traffic, this is not an efficient solution for
network intrusion detection. This also easily overloads the capacity of a network administrator. To overcome this
problem, Weight factor (w) and threshold values are used to distinguish malicious behaviours from the normal
behaviours. According to our experiments, the (higher and lower) threshold values for host marx are [1.9187e04,
6.6759e03] respectively.

TESTING OF GSAD MODEL ON GATECH ATTACK DATASET
Test dataset (GATECH attack dataset)
For our experiments, we focus on the attacks coming through HTTP service only. HTTP-based attacks are mainly from
the HTTP GET/POST request at the server side. GATECH attack dataset is publicly available (Perdisci et al., 2009;
Cooke, 2002). This is a labelled dataset and has several non-polymorphic HTTP attacks provided by Ingham and Inoue
(Cooke, 2002) and several polymorphic HTTP attacks generated by Perdisci et al. (2009) using both the polymorphic
engine CLET and a Polymorphic Blending Attack engine. The attacks are divided into four groups, namely Generic
attacks, Shell-code attacks, CLET attacks and Polymorphic Blending attacks (PBAs). All HTTP request attack packets
are used in our experimentation.

(a) Character relative frequency of normal GET traffic

(b) Mahalanobis Distance Map of normal GET traffic

Figure 1. Character Relative Frequency and Mahalanobis Distance Map of Normal GET Traffic for Host marx
Model Testing
In our definition of attack detection, an attack is detected as long as one of its attack packets is identified as abnormal.
We conduct experiments on testing dataset and evaluate similarity between the MDM pattern of new incoming packet
profile with the MDM pattern of normal profile using a Weight factor (w) and a threshold value. The incoming request is
considered as an attack or a threat if the Weight factor is more than +3δ or less than -3δ. Results are ‘very encouraging’
and almost all the attack instances are detected successfully with no false negative. Due to the limitation of space, only
the results of some of the attacks are discussed here.
a. Generic attacks: This dataset consists of 67 HTTP attacks. The attacks cause Information Leakage and Denial of
Service (DoS). Our model could detect around 90% of these attacks. Figs. 2(a), (b) and (c) show MDM results for some
Generic attacks.
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(a) Information leakage attack

(b) Input validation error attack

(c) Signed interpretation of
unsigned value

Figure 2. Mahalanobis Distance Map of Generic attacks
b. Shell-code Attacks: Shell-code attacks are particularly very harmful as they inject executable code and hijack the
normal execution of the target application. This dataset contains 11 shell-code attacks from the Generic Attack dataset.
Some famous worms, such as Code-Red Worm, use shell code attacks to propagate. Figs. 3(a) and (b) show MDM results
for the behaviours of Code-Red worm attack and Get Buffer Over-flow attack.

(a) Code-Red worm attack

(b) Get Buffer Over-flow attack

Figure 3. Mahalanobis Distance Map of Shell-code attacks
c. CLET Attacks: These attacks are generated from 8 shell-code attacks using polymorphic engine CLET. Polymorphic
version of each attack uses the payload statistics computed on each distinct day of traffic from DARPA and GATECH
datasets for training CLET polymorphic engine. Overall, 96 polymorphic attacks are present in the dataset. Figure 4 shows
MDM results for the behaviour of padded attack (polymorphic attack) CLET attack.

Figure 4. Mahalanobis Distance Map of padded attack (polymorphic attack)
d. Polymorphic Blending attacks (PBA): This dataset is generated using three attacks, namely Code-Red, DDK and an
attack against Windows Media Service. These attacks exploit the different vulnerabilities in the Windows systems. Five
different hosts are selected randomly from GATECH dataset to create PBAs for the three attacks. Figure 5 shows MDM
result for the behaviour of Window Media Service attack (polymorphic blending attack).
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Figure 5. Mahalanobis Distance Map of Window Media Service attack (polymorphic blending attack)
The testing results for various attacks are shown in Figure 2–Figure 5. The figures show clear differences between the
behaviour of the various attack profiles and the normal HTTP request profile. Furthermore, the correlations between the
features in these attacks are different from the correlations between the features of normal HTTP requests on the hosts
marx and hume. Again, the X axis and Y axis show the 256 possible features (ASCII characters) present in a packet
payload. The cross points in the figure represents the correlation between two features.

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The GSAD model is evaluated in terms of its detection rate and false negative rates and its ability to classify the attacked
‘HTTP request’ packets correctly. The results in Section II show that the Geometrical Structure Anomaly Detector
(Mahalanobis Distance Map) can detect new attacks including polymorphic attack and PBAs without prior knowledge of
the attacks with high accuracy.
Selection of threshold value is very important for the evaluation of IDS as this directly impacts the performance of the
IDS. Standard deviation of Weight factor w of the observed samples is used to determine the threshold value. We assume
that the distribution is normal, three standard deviations of Weight factor accounts for 99% of the sample population.
Therefore, we set the threshold values to be -3δ and +3δ in our experiments for achieving optimal detection rates and low
false positive alarm rates. The results tested on all attack groups except the generic attack group show constant
performance for various sets of threshold values. GSAD has a very low false positive rate for DARPA 1999 dataset
compared with other IDS systems as shown in Table I.
The computational complexity is based on 1-byte Mahalanobis distance map calculations (2562). Taking computational
complexity and heavy network traffic into consideration, this limits the application of the model in real-time
environment. To improve the complexity of GSAD model, we need to reduce the dimensionality of MDM matrix from
2562 to low dimension matrix. To our knowledge, many other anomaly models are also complex and inefficient.
The results of comparison of various models are shown in Table 1. Table 1 shows the comparison of GSAD, McPAD
and PAYL models on GATECH attack datasets. In comparison to PAYL and McPAD, our model could achieve 100%
detection rate.
Table 1.

Detection Rate of GSAD, McPAD and PAYL on GATECH Attack Datasets

Algorithm

False Positive Rates

Detection Rate
Generic
attack

Shell code
attack

CLET attack

GSAD

90%

100%

100%

0.087% On DRAPA 1999
dataset

McPAD

75%

96%

99%

1%

PAYL

90%

99%

95%

1%
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FEATURE REDUCATION MODULE
Current anomaly Intrusion Detection Systems are not efficient for real time intrusion detection due to high computational
complexity. In this section we further propose a novel approach for the selection of most discriminating features to
improve the computational complexity of GSAD model. Linear Discriminant method (LDA) (Cooke, 2002) is used for
the feature reduction and classification of the incoming network traffic. Using LDA, an optimal projection matrix can be
found to transform higher dimensional feature domain to a lower dimensional space and to preserve most of the
signification information for data classification. LDA is used to select significant features from Mahalanobis Distance
Map (MDM), which is generated by Geometrical Structure Model (GSM) for each single network packet.

FEATURE SELECTION
To select the most discriminating features, we first prepare a large number of normal and attack sample packets, and
calculate MDMs using the equations in ((Jamdagini et al., 2010)) for all of the samples. The Mahalanobis distance map is
denoted by  ൌ ൣሺ୧ǡ୨ሻ ൧
. D1normal, …, Dmnormal and D1attack, …, Dmattack indicate the MDMs for the normal and the
ଶହൈଶହ
attack packets respectively.
Next, we calculate the difference at element (i, j) between normal and attack sample packets using equations (6) in [20]
and equation (1).
݂݂݅ܦሺǡሻ ൌ 

ೌೌೖ మ
ೌ
ሺௗതሺǡೕሻ
ିௗതሺǡೕሻ
ሻ
మ
మ
ఙೌሺǡೕሻ ାఙೌೌೖሺǡೕሻ

ሺ݅ǡ ݆  אሾͲǡ ʹͷͷሿሻ





(1)

The average MDMs of normal HTTP and Phf attack sample packets are shown in Figure 6, and the difference map is
shown in Figure 7. There are totally 256 × 256 features in the average MDMs and the difference map.

Figure 6. Average Mahalanobis Distance
Maps of Phf Attack Packets

Figure 7. Difference Map Between Normal
HTTP and Phf Attack Packets

As can be seen from the above figures, those normal and attack packets present clearly different behaviours. However, if
the whole difference map is directly involved into each differentiation, it will cause heavy workload for real-time
intrusion detection. Thus, a feature selection approach is designed to avoid this problem. The process of the approach is
shown in Figure 8. In the difference map, we consider a feature with the larger value as a more important feature in
discriminating normal and attack packets. So, the r largest features are selected from the difference map initially. These
features are constructed an r dimensional distance value vector denoted as Dr,k = [dk(Ur,1 ,Vr,1), dk(Ur,2 ,Vr,2), …, dk(Ur,r ,Vr,r)]T,
where (Ur,1, Vr,1), (Ur,2, Vr,2), …, (Ur,r, Vr,r) indicate the positions of the r largest features in the difference map and r is
range from 1 to 256 × 256, and k indicates the k-th sample.
According to the selected Dr, a projection matrix Ar is computed using equation (2).
ഥ  σ ܦ
ഥ௧௧ ሻିଵ ሺܦ
ഥ െ ܦ
ഥ௧௧ ሻ
ܣ ൌ ሺσ ܦ

(2)
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௧௧
ഥ ௧௧ are the averages of ܦǡ
ഥ and σ ܦ
ഥ௧௧ are the covariances of
ഥ andܦ
andܦǡ
, and σ ܦ
where ܦ

௧௧
andܦǡ .
ܦǡ

The whole process will be conducted iteratively until the number of significant features reaches the pre-set value, and the
projection matrix Ar will be determined.
BEGIN
Select r most significant features and their
positions in the difference map

Check Feature number >
Pre-set number

No

Ye
Calculate Mean and covariance for distribution
of normal packet and attack packet according to
the positions of the significant features

Calculate projection matrix Ar

Discard the n smallest features in the Ar
projection matrix and keep the positions of the
remaining significant features

Obtain the final most significant features and
their positions in the MDM
END
Figure 8.

Flow Chart for Feature Selection

RECOGNITION PROCESS
Similar to the recognition process in (Chen et al., 2007), projection matrix Ar, and the r selected significant features are
used to calculate the score value for each input network packet.
௨௧

 ݁ݎܿݏൌ ܣ  ൈ  ܦ

(3)

If the score is larger than a pre-calculated threshold, the input network packet will be classified as attack packet. The
threshold is selected using the LDA optimizing criterion (Cooke, 2002) which finds out the maximum ratio of betweenclass difference and within-class difference.

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluated the LDA feature selection approach on the DARPA 1999 IDS dataset (Lippmann et al., 2000). In the
experiments, we considered inbound HTTP traffic only. 2600 normal HTTP request packets and 2600 Phf attack packets
are used in the evaluation. The experimental results are shown in Table 2.
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